Wednesday 20, Thursday 21 December – International Conference – The ‘Great Recession’ as a pivotal moment: economy, politics, contention

20 

December

Wednesday

11.30-12.00:

Welcoming remarks

Professor Seraphim Seferiades (Director of the Laboratory on Contentious Politics), Professor Christina Koulouri (Rector, Panteion University)

12.15-13.00:

Post-democracy after the Great Recession (Colin Crouch – via zoom)

Post-democracy describes a situation where, while all the forms of democracy continue, these are becoming an empty shell, while the real forces at play are relations between politics and economic elites.

 

The financial crisis

The financial crisis of 2008 was a perfect example of post-democracy. First, the deregulation of global finance that caused the crisis was the result of the ‘revolving doors’ of US government, whereby leading banking officials entered government to organize waves of deregulation of their sector, before going back to their banks. Second, when political leaders set about resolving the crisis, they placed all the burden on debtor countries, firms and individuals, barely touching the banks, whose behaviour had caused the problem in the first place.

  But would stronger democracies have behaved any differently? Deregulation brought short-term benefits to firms, individuals and governments. Would they have been willing to listen to cautious voices? Would it have made a difference if there had been more diversity in the economic advice reaching governments?

 

The Covid-19 crisis

Since the financial crisis the world has suffered the Covid-19 crisis. This had some contradictory implications for democracy. First, in some countries (especially the UK) politicians took advantage of the opportunity to spend vast sums of money on health equipment without the usual rules of competitive contracts and transparency. They heaped lucrative contracts on their friends and associates, leading to massive waste and corruption. This reminds us of the importance of watchfulness and scrutiny over the behaviour of politicians – things that only democracy can provide.

   Second, Covid-19 brought us great attention to public policy as we all watched the crisis evolve, and also stronger civil societies as communities organized to help each other. We rediscovered the importance of collective action and public services – lessons that found their way through to public policy, especially in the European Union.

   But third, the corona crisis also fed a mass of conspiracy theories and suspicion of government activities, feeding a trend also started on social media. This is a symptom of democracy being weak, breaking trust relations between politics and citizens.

 

The crisis of xenophobic populism

Conspiracy theories and low trust have reinforced the already strong appeal of xenophobic populist movements. These share some of the language of my post-democracy critique, but they are not democracy’s friends. The standard form of populist appeal is to elevate a great leader, who claims to embody the will of the people. Therefore, anything that stands in his way is an enemy of the people: laws, conventions, institutions. This is not democracy. Democracy needs institutions that protect it from the leaders it produces, as it can never be claimed that one person embodies the will of the people – that will is in any case usually divided.

 

Conclusions

One of the less noticed of the consequences of the financial crisis and great recession was a disillusion with public institutions by ordinary citizens, and this has in turn fed the rise of xenophobic populism that brings worse problems for democracy than post-democracy. Citizens were already becoming detached from politics as the forces of social class and religion that once enabled them to identify with parties were weakening. In their place stands the nation – a powerful identity for nearly everyone, but one that does not help solve problems in a world of inter-dependence. Populists have seized on this, which is why xenophobia is so useful to them. The future of democracy may well depend on the discovery of rival identities as powerful as nation. What might these be? 

 

13.00-14.30:

Intermission

14.30-16.30:

Crisis, Democracy, Capitalism (Chair: S. Seferiades)

Depicting the precise nature of the systemic crisis –the identity of the critical actors, their motives, and outcomes of their actions from a dynamic perspective— constitutes a major challenge not only for Contentious Politics but for Political Sociology as a whole.

– Never let a good crisis go to waste. Crisis as an opportunity (Ν. Theocharakis)

– Economic crisis and democratic legacy (S. Tombazos)

– Economic crises and political change: the programmatic stagnation of Social Democracy in view of the ‘Great Recession’ (G. Moschonas)

16.45-18.45:

Experiencing crisis, social vulnerabilities (Chair: A. Kapsalis)

The Greek bankruptcy and the policies implemented to address it involve the systematic dissolution of labor relations, the degradation of social security, and the normalization of poverty. These are all dimensions of public life that require detailed exploration.

– The violent downgrading of work as ‘normalcy’ (G. Kouzis)

– The deregulation of social insurance as the construction of regimes of insecurity and risk (V. Koumarianos)

– Individual responsibility, extreme poverty management, and social policy (N. Kourachanis)

19.00-21.00:

Solidarity economy, the commons (Chair: A. Koronaiou)

Besides being inherently dynamic, the multitude of social resistances also include new forms of self-organization. The realm of social and solidarity economy has brought to the fore the issue of commons with multiple theoretical implications.

– Crisis and the alternative perspective of the commons, 2010-2020. Greek and international experience in Southern Europe (A. Kioupkiolis)

– Crisis, state, movements, and the emergence of the Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE) in Greece (K. Kavoulakos)

– Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE) in the light of social transformation (G. Bekridaki)

21

December

Thursday

10.00-12.00:

Political parties, social movements: a perpetual interaction (Chair: S. Sakellaropoulos)

Despite contrary expectations, the exact relationship between political parties and social movements continues to be an ‘unknown familiar’. Its clarification requires sufficient explanatory probing which holds theoretical promise for both fields.

– The ‘cartel-party model’ through the lens of the Greek case. (S. Seferiades)

– The SYRIZA strategy: a recasting (K. Tsikas)

–  The SYRIZA experience: rise and fall (G. Mavris)

 

12.15-14.15:

Participation, abstention, demobilization (Chair: G. Moschonas)

If the ‘crisis of representation’ is not to become another ‘black box’ of political science, thorough investigation is required into the mechanisms that cause abstention and demobilization. Understanding them is also a prerequisite for addressing the problem.

– Abstention 2007-2023: quantitative and political aspects (P. Koustenis)

– Party demobilization: the 2015 referendum as a turning point (K. Kostopoulos)

– Political cynicism and electoral abstention in the shadow of the 2015 referendum (A. Kontogiannis-Mandros, K. Gousis)

14.15-15.45:

Intermission

15.45-17.45:

Collective action repertoires, radicalization, solidarity (Chair: K. Tsikas)

The ways in which subaltern classes and strata assert their claims vary during periods of dense political time. Adequate understanding this social-movement dimension raises critical conceptual and theoretical issues.

– Resilience, political altruism, heterotopy in crisis-ridden Greece, 2010-2016: a conceptual approach (L. Kotronaki)

– Direct Social Action in healthcare: protest and solidarity in Greece, 2010-2020 (S. Christou)

–  Union activism in collective action fields: A comparative look (M. Diani)

18.00-20.30:

The protest cycle, 2008-18: ascent, decline, delegation (Chair: L. Kotronaki)

The great protest cycle erupting during the crisis went through different phases. Understanding its ascent and decline requires taking into serious account the strategic intervention of critical political actors.

– Middle-range social movement dynamics: changes in the rhythm of collective action in 21st century Greece (N. Serntedakis, V. Roggas)

– The protest cycle through the emblematic struggle of ERT: political opportunity structure, framings, collective action repertoires (C. Avramidis)

– The KKE during 2010-2015: a preliminary approach (V. Karatzis)

– The heuristic value of studying political intervention in protest cycles (K. Kanellopoulos)

20.35-22.00:

Cinematographic research in the social sciences: the EPOCA program (Chair: I. Panagopoulos)

The cinematographic form presupposes language, yet it conveys dimensions of the universe that language itself can seldom convey. The mutual relationship is captured in the documentary Co-contributor of Time: Testimonies of Struggle and Solidarity in Crisis-Ridden Greece.

E. Knudsen, Kotronaki, S. Seferiades, T. Tsiggas